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Abstract: The spillages due to collisions related incidents involving the wagon tankers, which 
carrying hazardous materials (hazmat), can be followed by fi res or explosions, presents 
a severe threat to the safety of residents and nearby buildings. In this study, ALOHA and 
PHAST was used to evaluate the level of thermal radiation at different distances from 
the place of accident. Discussed scenario analyze a leakage of kerosene from a tanker 
wagon, from different opening diameters, where is formed a pool fi re. As an assumption 
for location of possible accident, parts of the railway where it can be expected a large 
number of people and vehicles were taken. For study area was chosen city of Niš, Serbia. 
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Introduction
The transport of hazardous materials may present 
a hazard to the transporter, the crew, or the public. 
The relative importance of these varies between 
the different modes of transport. The hazards 
presented by the transport of chemicals are: fi re, 
explosion and toxic release (conventional toxic 
substances, ultra-toxic substances).
Transport risk assessment involves defi ning 
the scope of analysis, describing the system or 
movement, as well as routes, identifying hazards 
or initiating events (incident or non-incident), 
numerating incidents, selecting incidents, incidents 
outcomes and incident outcome cases, estimating 
consequence, estimating frequencies, combining 
frequencies and consequences to estimate risk, and 
evaluating risk reduction alternatives. 
The risk assessment of transportation of 
chemicals is dynamic due to the movement of 
the chemical carriers through a variety of locations 
along the route. Because of that, the risk assessment 
should consider a variety of factors that determine 
the exposure at different areas along the route of 
chemical transportation, such as (Mannan 2012):
• Number of containers;
• Chemical volume per shipment;
• Trip distance;
• Number of trips;
 Number and size of population centers along 
the route, including very dense populations 
(Hot-spots);
• Environmental contamination considerations 
such as municipal water supply reservoirs along 
the route;
• Proximity to landmarks;
• Proximity to public venues;
• Storage in transit such as rail yards, leased tracks.
A hydrocarbon tank fi re is a relatively rare 
accident that may lead to unexpected consequences 
for the inhabitants and their environment. These 
accidents demonstrate not only the large-scale 
of destruction in the surroundings, together with 
the implication of potential environmental issues, 
but also the necessity to prevent similar accidents 
(Pitbaldo 2010). A lot of researches are related with 
the estimation of plume dispersion, ground-level 
concentrations of the toxic pollutants, evaluation 
of thermal radiation and overpressure impacts, 
in order to evaluate possible risks zones for different 
hazardous materials (hazmat). According to 
the US Department of Transportation, a hazardous 
materials are defi ned as any substance or material 
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capable of causing harm to people, property, and 
the environment (Chakrabarti & Parikh 2013). 
The United Nations sorts hazmats into nine classes 
and the percentage of accidental release cases 
involving a particular class of materials, out of which 
fl ammable-combustible liquids contribute to 42.3 % 
and corrosives (e.g. acids and caustics) 37.5 % of 
cases whereas poisonous substances were involved 
in 5.2 % of cases (Erkut et al., 2007). 
Study area
For study area was taken city of Nis, which is 
the third largest city in Serbia. The city area occupies 
596,73 km2, and it is administratively divided into 
fi ve city municipalities: Medijana, Palilula, Pantelej, 
Crveni Krst and Niška Banja. Various types of 
transportation that are present on the territory of 
Nis, railway has higher damage potential, because 
most of the railway line that passes through the city 
is in a residential area (see Fig. 1). The safety and 
effi ciency of rail transport must be considered as 
strategic goal for local government. 
Fig. 1. Railway line that passes through the city 
with marked railway crossing places
On Figures 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d are shown marked 
railway crossing. 
Fig. 1a. Railway crossing - point 1
Fig. 1b. Railway crossing - point 2
Fig. 1c. Railway crossing - point 3
Fig. 1d. Railway crossing - point 4
Objective
This paper presents an analysis and simulation 
of an accident which involves a transportation of 
kerosene in wagon tanker. The scenario where 
kerosene is leaking from tanker, and start to burn 
and forms a pool fi re was discussed. In that case, 
the calculation was carried out for evaluation of 
thermal radiation level on surrounding population and 
environment. For that purpose, simulation software 
ALOHA and PHAST are used, and their results are 
compared, in order to obtain precise results. 
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Materials and methods
The air dispersion model ALOHA and PHAST 
were utilized to predict the thermal radiation level 
of a kerosene release from wagon tanker. Those 
programs are based on dispersion model that has 
ability to estimate vulnerable zones during handling 
with hazmats, and visually displays endangered 
zones on the map, which aims to better understand 
the situation of endangered area. 
ALOHA is a computer program designed to 
model chemical releases for emergency responders 
and planners. The primary purpose is to provide 
an estimate of the hazards associated with the short-
term accidental releases of volatile and fl ammable 
chemicals. It helps in quantifying the impact on 
human health because of various situations such 
as inhalation of toxic vapors, thermal radiation of 
chemical fi res, and effect of the pressure wave from 
vapor cloud explosions (EPA, 2013).
PHAST is the industry standard tool for process 
hazard analysis. It is the most comprehensive 
process industry hazard analysis and consequence 
assessment software, which examines the progress 
of a potential incident from the initial release to 
far fi eld dispersion, including modelling of fuel 
spreading and evaporation, and fl ammable and toxic 
effects of fi re and explosion. 
Table 1 provides a comparative picture of 
ALOHA and PHAST equations used in computations 
of pool fi re simulations. 
Input data
In rail transport, wagon tanker is a type 
of unpressurized tank for fl ammable liquids 
transportation, with minimum plate thickness of 
11.1 mm, and maximum capacity of 131 m3. Tanks 
may be constructed from carbon steel, aluminum 
alloy, high alloy steel or nickel plate steel by fusion 
welding. In our case, approximant dimensions of 
tanker are: diameter: 3 m; length: 16 m; volume: 
118 m3; mass in the tank is: 97.4 t. 
Table 1. Equations used for various parameters in the pool fi re models
Parameters ALOHA PHAST 
Discharge rate (Qt), kg/s 
Chocked 
?? ? ????????????????? ?
?
?? ? ?
?
????
????
?????? 
Unchocked 
?? ? ????????????
??
?? ? ?
??
??
??
?
?
??
? ?
??
??
?
????
??
? ?????? 
Time varying 
?? ? ????? ? ??? ?????????? ? ????????????????? 
Gas velocity in expanding (uj), 
m/s ?? ? ???
??????
???
??????? ?
???
? ? ??? ? ?????
??? 
?? ?
??
?????
 
Expended radius 
?? ? ?
??
?????
?
?
?
??? 
Mach number (Mj) 
For unchocked flow, Mach number given as 
?? ? ?
??? ? ???? ? ?????
?
? ? ??
??? ? ??
?
?
?
? ? ? ?????? ? ???? ?
??
???
?
??
?????
 
For chocked flow, Mach number given as 
?? ?
???? ? ?? ?
??
??
?
??????
?? ? ?
??? ? ??
???? ? ??????
??
???
?
??
?????
???????? ?
???
? ? ??
??? 
For unchocked flow, Mach number given as 
?? ? ?
??? ? ???? ? ?????
?
? ? ??
??? ? ??
?
?
?
? ?? ? ?
? ? ???
?????? ? ???? ? ??
?
?
? ?? ??????? 
? ? ?
??????? ? ?? ? ??
?
? ?
???? ? ??
?
???
 
For chocked flow, Mach number given as 
?? ?
???? ? ?? ?
??
??
?
??????
?? ? ?
??? ? ??
???? ? ?
?????? ? ?? ? ?
??? ? ??
?
?
??
????
?
? ?????? 
?? ?
???? ? ???
?
???? ?? ? ?
?? ? ???
?????? ? ??
?
?
? ?? ??????? 
Effective source diameter 
(Ds), m ?? ? ???
??
??
??????? ? ??????? ? ????
??
??
?
??
?????
??? ????
??
??
??? 
Flame length (LB), m ?? ? ????????? ? ???? ? ??????? ? ???? ?? ? ??????????????? ? ????? ? ?? ? ?????????? ? ???? ??? 
Flame length in still air (LB0), 
m 
??? ?
?
??????????????? ? ??????? ? ???? ? ??????? ? ????
 
??? ? ??????? ? ??? ? ??
?
??
?
? ? ??? ? ?
?
??
???
??
?
?
; 
???? ? ??
???
???
?
?
?
 
Flame lift-off (b), m 
? ? ??
?????
??? ?
???? 
? ? ?????????? ? ????? 
? ?
??
??
 
? ? ??
?????????????? ? ???????
??? ?
?????? ? ?
??????? ? ??
????????? ? ????
 
?
???
? ?????? ? ??????? 
Angle between hole and flame 
axis 
???? ? ???? 
? ?
????? ? ????????? ? ????? ? ????????????
??????
 
???? ? ???? 
? ?
??????? ? ????? ? ???????????? ? ????? ? ?????????????
??????
?????? ? ??? ?
?
??????
?
?
?
 
?? ? ? ???? 
? ? ?
???????
?????
? ???? ? ????? ? ????????? 
???? ? ???? 
? ?
??????? ? ????? ? ????
?????
? ???? ? ????? ? ????????? ?????? ? ??? ?
?
??????
?
?
?
 
Length of frustum (RL), m ?? ? ????? ? ???????? ? ? ???? ???? ?? ? ????? ? ???????? ? ? ???? ???? 
Width of the Frustum base 
(W), m ?? ? ??????????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ?
?
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
? ???????????????? ?? ? ??????????????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?? ?
?
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
? ???????????????? 
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ALOHA Software
PHAST software
Fig. 2a. Thermal radiation level distances - hole size 
100 mm
For estimating thermal radiation levels, releasing 
of kerosene was considered for three hole sizes: 
large - 100 mm, medium - 50 mm and small - 25 mm 
respectively and formation of various pool radius. 
In the simulation it was observed that the hole is at 
the bottom of the tank. Calculation in ALOHA is 
limited to a 60 min, so it will be analyze the quantity 
of kerosene which was leaked in that period. 
Meteorology
According to the Republic Hydrometeorological 
Service of Serbia, North-West is the most prominent 
wind direction in Niš, air temperature is 20 °C 
and estimated air humidity is 68 %. Based on 
Regulations about content of prevention policies and 
methodology for making safety report and accident 
protection plans (Gazette of RS, no. 41/2010), wind 
speed is 2-3 m/s and atmospheric stability class is D 
(neutral). 
Results and discussions
The thermal radiation level distances have 
been estimated for different hole sizes and 
the comparative analysis for ALOHA and PHAST 
are shown in Table 2.
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c shows the simulation 
results of thermal radiation levels from the pool fi re 
by using ALOHA and PHAST simulators. The same 
values of the parameters such as the atmospheric 
conditions, fi lling ratio, tanker dimensions etc. were 
taken for both the simulators. 
ALOHA software 
Hole size  
(mm) 
Max flame 
length  
(m) 
Max burn 
rate 
(kg/min) 
Total amount 
burned  
(kg) 
Puddle 
diameter 
(m) 
Thermal radiation level distances (m) 
>10kW/m2 >5 kW/m2 >2 kW/m2 
100 18 354 20974 10.8 22 32 51 
50 11 88.6 5243 5.4 10 16 26 
25 7 22.1 1311 2.7 < 10 < 10 15 
PHAST software 
Hole 
size 
(mm) 
Max 
burn 
rate 
[kg/min] 
Total 
amount 
burned 
(kg) 
Puddle 
diameter 
(m) 
Thermal radiation level distances (m) 
>10kW/m2 >5 kW/m2 >2 kW/m2 
Distance 
downwind 
Distance 
crosswind 
Distance 
downwind 
Distance 
crosswind 
Distance 
downwind 
Distance 
crosswind 
100 951 57060 16.3118 15.69 14.86 25.43 24.77 41.8 42.57 
50 237.6 14256 8.15 13.03 12.36 19.35 19.43 30.91 31.94 
25 59.4 3564 4.077 8.98 8.67 12.92 13.24 20.63 21.47 
Table 2. Consequence analysis for pool fi re scenario and estimated thermal radiation levels for different hole sizes
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Fig. 2c. Thermal radiation level distances - hole size 
25 mm
From compared results, it can be seen that 
the zone distances from the simulators are similar 
and that any one of them can be chosen for estimating 
the pool fi re risk zones dimensions. 
Death zone stretches in all three cases, for 
ALOHA in radius up to 22 m, 10 m and less than 
10 m. PHAST estimated radius for this zones up 
to approximately 15 m, 13 m and 9 m. After lethal 
zone, in second zone it can be expected second 
degree burns on unprotected skin and pain within 
approximately 10 seconds of exposure. Diameter of 
second zones for ALOHA are 32 m, 16 m and less 
than 10 m, and for PHAST they are 25 m, 19 m and 
13 m. Next zone, the last one, can cause pain for 
exposure durations of 60 seconds or less. It stretches 
in the radius of 51m, 26 m and 13 m for ALOHA, 
and for PHAST they are 42 m, 31 m and 21 m. 
After analyzing the results it can be noticed that 
by reducing the hole size on the tanker, the fl ow 
rate and total burning amount of kerosene leakage 
is drastically decreases. With hole increasing above 
100 mm, it can be expected far greater amount 
of leakage material, as well as the diameter of 
vulnerable zones. 
Signifi cant difference for release rate between 
ALOHA and PHAST can be noticed. PHAST 
calculate a larger amount of releasing kerosene from 
tanker for all three hole sizes. 
Fig. 2b. Thermal radiation level distances - hole size 
50 mm
Since that the observed railway crossings are 
located in parts of the city where the frequency of 
traffi c is increased, lot of people can be expected at 
any time, all three zones in all three cases will have 
extremely high infl uence on surrounding. 
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At Figure 4a, 4b and 4c can be seen the trend 
of declining thermal radiation levels. In all three 
cases, after maximum values are reached, its 
rapidly decrease as we move away from the source. 
This type of view can show more precise values, 
especially when ALOHA cannot draw zones with 
short distances. That situation is shown in case when 
hole size is 25 mm. Graphical interpretation shows 
only yellow zone, but when we perform detailed 
analyzation of thermal radiation levels, such is 
shown at Figure 4c, it can be seen all three zones. 
Fig. 4a. Trend of declining thermal radiation level 
for hole size 100 mm - ALOHA
Fig. 4b. Trend of declining thermal radiation level 
for hole size 50 mm - ALOHA
Fig. 4c. Trend of declining thermal radiation level 
for hole size 25 mm - ALOHA
Only in the last zone, it is noticed a drastic 
difference in the reduction of the radius which 
depends on the size of hole on tanker. In other zones 
there is no signifi cant difference. 
As regards for estimation for max thermal 
radiation, ALOHA calculate for large release of 
112 kW/m2, downwind from the source at a distance 
of 5.5 m; for medium release of 91.3 kW/m2, 
downwind from the source at a distance of 2.8 m; 
and for small release of 76.8 kW/m2, downwind 
from the source at a distance of 1.4 m (see Fig. 3a, 
3b, 3c). In all three cases max thermal radiation 
values are reached between 2-3 minutes after 
pool fi re was formed. That values are constant for 
the whole simulation time (60 min). 
Fig. 3a. Max thermal radiation - hole size 100 mm 
Fig. 3b. Max thermal radiation - hole size 50 mm
Fig. 3c. Max thermal radiation - hole size 25 mm
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In all three cases, for both simulators, after max 
values of thermal radiation are reached, declining 
trend of thermal radiation level can be noticed as it 
move away from the pool fi re. 
Conclusion
The thermal radiation results obtained were 
used to calculate the probability of burn injuries due 
to spillage of kerosene from tanker wagon in real 
scenarios. 
The models used give indications of hazardous 
zones following the release and dispersion of dangerous 
substances in densely inhabited areas. Nevertheless, 
the determination of hazardous zones is important to 
evaluate the possible consequences of major accidents 
or terrorist attacks (Bernatik et al., 2008).
Results by this study should be combined with 
emergency response for dealing with accident in 
the limit time.
Following a hazmat spillage, it is essential that 
immediate area within some specifi ed distance be 
initially isolated from the public and then depending 
on the situation and behavior of the chemical, more 
area has to be isolated as ‘protective zone’ for 
the purpose of minimizing the effect on public in 
the surrounding area (U.S. Department of 
Transportation 2008). 
Obtained results, for both simulators, shows 
similarity for estimating vulnerability zones. Hence, 
for emergency actions following a hazmat release 
event in the study area, simulation software such 
as ALOHA, which is open free software unlike 
PHAST, can be helpful for the responders to estimate 
‘Initial Isolation zone’ and ‘Protective Action Zone’, 
so people will be kept at a safe distance from the spill 
area, depending on the nature of hazmat involved 
(Chakrabarti & Parikh 2013).
Local authorities announce the relocation of 
the railway from the city center for a long time, 
which would signifi cantly reduce the risk of possible 
traffi c accidents, endangering people's lives, and 
at the same time reduce the risk of accident in 
the transport of dangerous goods. 
The results could be useful to make better 
comparisons of possible transport routes of 
dangerous substances in terms of the likely outcome 
of an accident.
This study can awaken awareness to local 
authorities to speed up the relocation of railway. 
The methodology that has been applied in this study 
can be used for new potential section of railway 
line, in order to identify the endangered zones and 
whether there is a danger to the surrounding. 
During calculation of thermal radiation values 
in PHAST, different maximum values are noticed. 
Unlike ALOHA, PHAST calculate thermal radiation 
from failure point, so it is possible to evaluate thermal 
radiation at tanker. Figure 5a, 5b and 5c shows 
the thermal radiation emanating from the pool fi re 
against the damage distance. Max thermal radiation, 
for large release is 93.54 kW/m2, for medium release 
is 65.07 kW/m2 and for small release is 36.93 kW/m2.
Fig. 5a. Trend of declining thermal radiation level 
for hole size 100 mm - PHAST
Fig. 5b. Trend of declining thermal radiation level 
for hole size 50 mm - PHAST
Fig. 5c. Trend of declining thermal radiation level 
for hole size 25 mm - PHAST
After analyzing the trend of declining thermal 
radiation, for large release in ALOHA value drops 
sharply at 47.2 kW/m2 at 7 m, until PHAST max 
value holds up to 1.5 m and after that it drops 
at 65.34 kW/m2 at 2.06 m. For medium release, 
in ALOHA value drops at 83 kW/m2 at 3.3 m, 
and after that it rapidly decrease at 34 kW/m2 at 
4 m. PHAST for this case holds max value up to 
3.85 m. Before long, thermal radiation level drops 
at 41.57 kW/m2 at 4.62 m. For small release, 
in ALOHA max thermal radiation value drops 
shortly at 29.8 kW/m2 at 2 m. 
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